In this article, we examine how regulators, prosecutors, and courts might support and encourage the efforts of organizations to not only reintegrate after misconduct but also to improve their conduct in a way that reduces their likelihood of re-offense. We explore a novel experiment in creative sentencing in Alberta Canada that aimed to try to change the behaviour of an industry by publicly airing the root causes of a failure of one the industry’s leaders. Drawing on this case and prior (...) work, we articulate a model for a responsive and restorative approach to organizational misconduct that balances the punitive role of regulators and courts with new roles in supporting and overseeing rehabilitation. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the contention that, over the past decades, we have been witnessing the rise of the ‘posthuman condition’. To this end, the analysis draws on the work of the contemporary philosopher Rosi Braidotti. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part centres on the concept of posthumanism, suggesting that it reflects a systematic attempt to challenge humanist assumptions underlying the construction of ‘the human’. The second part focuses (...) on the concept of post-anthropocentrism, demonstrating that it articulates a desire to reject the twin ideas of ‘species supremacism’ and ‘human exceptionalism’, which it seeks to replace with ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’. The third part is concerned with the concept of critical posthumanities, positing that its advocacy is based on the cross-fertilization of posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism. The fourth part offers an assessment of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, evaluating the extent to which it sheds new light on the ways in which our engagements with the world are shaped by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based dimensions. The paper concludes with a brief summary of the key insights gained from the preceding inquiry. (shrink)

I show that frequentism, as an explanation of probability in classical statistical mechanics, can be extended in a natural way to a decoherent quantum history space, the analogue of a classical phase space. The result is a form of finite frequentism, in which Gibbs’ concept of an infinite ensemble of gases is replaced by the quantum state expressed as a superposition of a finite number of decohering microstates. It is a form of finite and actual frequentism (as opposed to hypothetical (...) frequentism) insofar as all the microstates exist, in keeping with the decoherence-based Everett interpretation, and some versions of pilot-wave theory. (shrink)

Plusieurs générations de chercheurs internationaux interrogent l’esthétique de Merleau-Ponty suivant deux axes : d’une part, le dialogue constant et passionné avec des arts (peinture, littérature, cinéma) et ses protagonistes (Cézanne, Proust, Claude Simon) qui est à l’origine de l’esthétique de Merleau-Ponty, et dans d’autre part, l’impact de la pensée merleau-pontienne sur les arts, depuis le Minimal Art américain en passant par le Body Art et la danse contemporaine. Tandis que certaines contributions s’intéressent, en s’appuyant sur les inédits, au rapport (...) jusqu’ici moins étudié que Merleau-Ponty entretenait avec la musique, mais aussi avec la photographie, d’autres contributions jaugent l’héritage merleau-pontien dans des arts sur lesquels il n’a pas lui-même écrit (la sculpture, la danse ou le théâtre). Ce volume propose donc une première synthèse générale du rapport de Merleau-Ponty aux arts, tout en en indiquant les lignes de fuite et les horizons qui en font aujourd’hui, cinquante ans après sa mort, toute l’actualité. -/- Contributions d’Emmanuel Alloa, Ronald Bonan, Fabrice Bourlez, Mauro Carbone, Lambert Dousson, Eliane Escoubas, Barbara Formis, Paule Gioffredi, Adnen Jdey, Stefan Kristensen, Rosamaria Salvatore, Jenny Slatman, Bernhard Waldenfels, Benedetta Zaccarello. (shrink)

Although it is argued that social justice is a core concern for the discipline, nursing has not generally played a leadership role in the responses to many of the greatest social problems of our time. These include the accelerated rate of climate change, pandemic threats, systemic racism, growing health and social inequities, and the regulation of new technologies to ensure an equitable future ‘for all.’ In nursing codes of ethics, administration, education, policies, and practice, social justice is often claimed to (...) be a core value, yet it is rarely contextualized by philosophical or theoretical underpinnings. It appears that nurses’ commitment to social justice may stem more from a penchant for ‘doing good’ than an attempt to explore, understand, and enact what is meant by social justice from an ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspective. We contend that the dominance of a human science perspective in nursing contributes to a narrow definition of health and relegates many issues central to social justice to the margins of nurses’ care. In this article, we explore how the focus on ‘the human’ in the human science perspective may not only be limiting the capacity of nurses to develop strategies to adequately address social injustice, but in some instances, direct nurses to contribute to their very reproduction. We suggest that a critical interrogation of this human‐centric hegemony can identify avenues of rupture and introduce posthumanism as an additional philosophical perspective for consideration to help bridge the human‐social divide. (shrink)

This paper uses the example of the COVID-19 pandemic to analyse the danger associated with insufficient epistemic pluralism in evidence-based public health policy. Drawing on certain elements in Paul Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science, it discusses reasons for implementing more pluralism as well as challenges to be tackled on the way forward.

The causal exclusion argument supports the notion that causation should be thought of as a purely low-level affair. Here we argue instead in favour of high-level causation as a natural and meaningful notion that may even be more useful than causation at more fundamental physical levels. Our argument is framed in terms of a broadly interventionist conception of causation. Its essence is that causal relations at an appropriately high level can in a certain sense be less sensitive than those at (...) a fundamental, microscopic level. This means that in settings where causal relations at the physical level are not considered in the context of some suitable macro-level interpretation, statements concerning the low-level relations may be highly sensitive with respect to changes in background conditions. Using an example of accelerator experiments in particle physics, we consider what it means to characterize extremely sensitive low-level events as causal. (shrink)

The return to religion has perhaps become the dominant cliche of contemporary theory, which rarely offers anything more than an exaggerated echo of a political reality dominated by religious war. Somehow, the secular age seems to have been replaced by a new era, where political action flows directly from metaphysical conflict. The Faith of the Faithless asks how we might respond. Following Critchley's Infinitely Demanding, this new book builds on its philosophical and political framework, also venturing into the questions of (...) faith, love, religion and violence. Should we defend a version of secularism and quietly accept the slide into a form of theism--or is there another way? From Rousseau's politics and religion to the return to St. Paul in Taubes, Agamben and Badiou, via explorations of politics and original sin in the work of Schmitt and John Gray, Critchley examines whether there can be a faith of the faithless, a belief for unbelievers. Expanding on his debate with Slavoj Zizek, Critchley concludes with a meditation on the question of violence, and the limits of non-violence. (shrink)

Is it possible to approach quantum theory in a 'therapeutic' vein that sees its foundational problems as arising from mistaken conceptual presuppositions? The book explores the prospects for this project and, in doing so, discusses such fascinating issues as the nature of quantum states, explanation in quantum theory, and 'quantum non-locality'.

Empirical research on human–robot interaction has demonstrated how humans tend to react to social robots with empathic responses and moral behavior. How should we ethically evaluate such responses to robots? Are people wrong to treat non-sentient artefacts as moral patients since this rests on anthropomorphism and ‘over-identification’ —or correct since spontaneous moral intuition and behavior toward nonhumans is indicative for moral patienthood, such that social robots become our ‘Others’?. In this research paper, I weave extant HRI studies that demonstrate empathic (...) responses toward robots with the recent debate on moral status for robots, on which the ethical evaluation of moral behavior toward them is dependent. Patienthood for robots has standardly been thought to obtain on some intrinsic ground, such as being sentient, conscious, or having interest. But since these attempts neglect moral experience and are curbed by epistemic difficulties, I take inspiration from Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s ‘relational approach’ to explore an alternative way of accounting for robot patienthood based on extrinsic premises. Based on the ethics of Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup I argue that empathic responses can be interpreted as sovereign expressions of life and that these expressions benefit human subjects—even if they emerge from social interaction afforded by robots we have anthropomorphized. I ultimately develop an argument in defense of treating robots as moral patients. (shrink)

This paper argues that research on normative issues in the life sciences will benefit from a tighter integration of philosophy of science. We examine research on ethical, legal and social issues in the life sciences (“ELSI”) and discuss three illustrative examples of normative issues that arise in different areas of the life sciences. These examples show that important normative questions are highly dependent on epistemic issues which so far have not been addressed sufficiently in ELSI, RRI and related areas of (...) research. Accordingly, we argue for the integration of research on the epistemic aspects of the relevant areas of science into ELSI research to provide a better basis for addressing normative questions. (shrink)

This article examines compulsory vaccination from the perspective of Nozick's theory of rights. It argues that the unvaccinated are a threat, even if unintended, to the rights of others. The reasons Nozick provides for when such threats may be forcibly prevented, such as the identifiability of the rights violator, general fear of the risky activity, probability of harm, and the general benefits of the activity, are examined, and it is argued that those reasons weigh in favour of prohibition of the (...) threat and hence in favour of compulsory vaccination. It is also argued that anyone opposed to compulsory vaccination on Nozickian grounds faces a dilemma: if they reject compulsory vaccination, they also risk rejecting the very foundations of the legitimacy of the state. (shrink)

It is often supposed that valuable organisms are more valuable if they are rare. Likewise if they belong to endangered species. I consider what kinds of value rarity and endangerment can add in such cases. I argue that individual organisms of a valuable species typically have instrumental value as means to the end of preserving their species. This progenitive value, I suggest, tends to increase exponentially with rarity. Endlings, for their part, typically have little progenitive value; however, I argue that (...) they may nonetheless have persistence value because, merely by existing, they postpone the numerical extinction of their species. Finally, I propose that a sentient endling can have higher lifeworld value than it would have had were it not the last of its kind. This, I argue, is because when a sentient endling dies, very little of its lifeworld is preserved – and this, I suggest, can be a bad thing. (shrink)

Europe is inseparable from its history. That history has been extensively studied in terms of its political history, its economic history, its religious history, its literary and cultural history, and so on. Could there be a distinctively philosophical history of Europe? Not a history of philosophy in Europe, but a history of Europe that focuses on what, in its history and identity, ties it to philosophy. In the two volumes of Europe: A Philosophical History - The Promise of Modernity and (...) Beyond Modernity - Simon Glendinning takes up this question, telling the story of Europe's history as a philosophical history. In Part 1, The Promise of Modernity, Glendinning examines the conception of Europe that links it to ideas of rational Enlightenment and modernity. Tracking this self-understanding as it unfolds in the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx, Glendinning explores the transition in Europe from a conception of its modernity that was philosophical and religious to one which was philosophical and scientific. While this transition profoundly altered Europe's own history, Glendinning shows how its self-confident core remained intact in this development. But not for long. This volume ends with an examination of the abrupt shattering of this confidence brought on by the first world-wide war of European origin - and the imminence of a second. The promise of modernity was in ruins. Nothing, for Europe, would ever be the same again. (shrink)

Ethical decision-making is inherent to the research ethics committee deliberation process. While ethical codes, regulations, and research standards are indispensable in guiding this process,...

Physicians make some medical decisions without disclosure to their patients. Nondisclosure is possible because these are silent decisions to refrain from screening, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Nondisclosure is ethically permissible when the usual presumption that the patient should be involved in decisions is defeated by considerations of clinical utility or patient emotional and physical well-being. Some silent decisions - not all - are ethically justified by this standard. Justified silent decisions are typically dependent on the physician's professional judgment, experience and (...) knowledge, and are not likely to be changed by patient preferences. We condemn the inappropriate exclusion of the patient from the decision-making process. However, if a test or treatment is unlikely to yield a net benefit, disclosure and discussion are at times unnecessary. Appropriate silent decisions are ethically justified by such considerations as patient benefit or economy of time. (shrink)

According to the Everett interpretation, branching structure and ratios of norms of branch amplitudes are the objective correlates of chance events and chances; that is, 'chance' and 'chancing', like 'red' and 'colour', pick out objective features of reality, albeit not what they seemed. Once properly identified, questions about how and in what sense chances can be observed can be treated as straightforward dynamical questions. On that basis, given the unitary dynamics of quantum theory, it follows that relative and never absolute (...) chances can be observed; that only on repetition of a large numbers of similar trials can relative probabilities be measured; and so on. The epistemology of objective chances can in this way be worked out from the dynamics. its curious features are thus explained. But one aspect of chance set-ups seems to resist this subsuming of chancing to branching: how is it that chance involves uncertainty? And if that is not possible, on Everettian lines, then the whole project is doomed. I argue that in fact there is no difficulty in making sense of uncertainty in the face of branching. Contrary to initial impressions, the unitary formalism is consistent with a well-defined notion of self-locating uncertainty. It is also consistent without: the mathematics under-determines the metaphysics in these respects. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, people often anthropomorphize machines such as certain robots and computer and AI systems by erroneously attributing mental states to them. On this view, people almost irresistibly believe, even if only subconsciously, that machines with certain human-like features really have phenomenal or subjective experiences like sadness, happiness, desire, pain, joy, and distress, even though they lack such feelings. This paper questions this view by critiquing common arguments used to support it and by suggesting an alternative explanation. (...) Even if people’s behavior and language regarding human-like machines suggests they believe those machines really have mental states, it is possible that they do not believe that at all. The paper also briefly discusses potential implications of regarding such anthropomorphism as a popular myth. The exercise illuminates the difficult concept of anthropomorphism, helping to clarify possible human relations with or toward machines that increasingly resemble humans and animals. (shrink)

A volume of studies in philosophical logic by a group of younger philosophers in the UK. There is a core of problems in the theory of meaning which have been accorded a central importance by philosophers, logicians and theoretical linguists, and which have stimulated some of the most powerful and original work in these subjects. The contributors to the volume have a common interest in these topics, insist on their continuing and fundamental importance, and offer here a distinctive and original (...) contribution to them. (shrink)

In Thinking like a Mall Steven Vogel argues that there is no authoritative nature independent of human standards to which one can appeal to correct damaging environmental practices. Human practices are the only basis for interpreting the environment and our ecologically destructive practices have made our environment into the degraded thing that it is. Revising these flawed practices requires becoming alienated from them; only then can we be responsible for them. Alienation is overcome by a democratic community who chooses the (...) practices that correct deficient ones and that we can recognise as expressions of ourselves and be at home in. This paper argues that there is a key step missing in this process, which is how we become alienated from our practices. It is only by appreciating the broader social and institutional horizon, ‘Ethical Life’, by which norms receive their authority and lose it, that we can understand alienation and the normative change necessary to correct it. (shrink)

I restate the view defended in my ‘Patriotism as Bad Faith’, offer a different argument for it, and respond to some objections from Steve Nathanson and Keith Horton.

Tourism to sites of war, conflict, terror and violence is hugely popular. All manner of tours and visits are organised worldwide, every day, to both current and historic conflict sites. Some are once-in-a-lifetime events, such as tours of current conflict sites in the Middle East or to the battlegrounds of World War II, some are routine family visits, such as day trips to local castles. Some visits focus on war and battles themselves, others focus on sites that were the centres (...) of conflict in a broader sense, such as notorious prisons or torture chambers. What strikes us is the absence of sustained, critical attention to conflict tourism from philosophers. This paper narrows matters into a more manageable form. We focus on the idea of tourist visits to conflict heritage sites, some of which are adapted for mass, regular, safe tourism. In this chapter we have three aims: first, to raise awareness of the phenomena and show they merit sustained philosophical interest; second, to outline some relevant philosophical questions; third, to offer some initial responses to these questions. Our overall claim, voiced at various intervals, is that one can, at most, develop general, defeasible ideas both about the phenomena and about what one should do. (shrink)

Trust is a natural mechanism by which an autonomous party, an agent, can deal with the inherent uncertainty regarding the behaviours of other parties and the uncertainty in the information it shares with those parties. Trust is thus crucial in any decentralised system. This paper builds on recent efforts to use argumentation to reason about trust. Specifically, a set of schemes is provided, and abstract patterns of reasoning that apply in multiple situations geared towards trust. Schemes are described in which (...) one agent, A, can establish arguments for trusting another agent, B, directly, as well as schemes that A can use to construct arguments for trusting C, where C is trusted by B. For both sets of schemes, a set of critical questions is offered that identify the situations in which these schemes can fail. (shrink)

The focus of the study is the understanding of self-sufficiency [αὐτάρϰεια] in early cynicism. A focused approach reveals that autarky in this context is a multidimensional concept that cannot be limited to the classical understanding of the physical or external renunciation of goods but goes beyond it. At least five dimensions can be named: (i) self-sufficiency due to physical depletion, (ii) self-sufficiency due to external reduction of goods, (iii) self-sufficiency through socio-cultural asset relativization, (iv) self-sufficiency through political relevance and ultimately (...) (v) self-sufficiency through educational and scientific relativization. The thesis of this study is that this multidimensional understanding of self-sufficiency can be seen, firstly, as the constitutive pivot of the practical-political approaches of the early cynicism, but secondly, has a further aim and is translated into a broader term: ἐγκράτεια, understood as the all-encompassing rule of man over himself. (shrink)